

A GUIDE FOR ESTABLISHING A STATE DEFENSE FORCE WITH A HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION

Colonel Martin Hershkowitz, OCP, (MDDF-Ret)
and
Brigadier General Herbert O. Wardell, Jr., (DNG-Ret)

BACKGROUND

The State Defense Force (SDF), or State Guard or State Militia as it has been traditionally known, was typically thought to be the State's National Guard "Reserve." Its missions were typically to protect armories when National Guard (NG) units were on annual active service or when the units were activated in support of a Federal mission; to "Troop the Colors" at public events and parades when the National Guard was not able to perform that activity; to conduct military burials and other Honor Guard duties when the National Guard was not able to perform that activity as well; to provide special military-style support activities as requested by local jurisdictions [with the Adjutant General's (TAG's) specific approval]; and, in some very rare cases, based on that TAG's beliefs about the viability and credibility of his SDF, to conduct "crowd control" and other military police functions on a case by case basis.

Today, however, the world has changed significantly and the National Guard has many more missions than was anticipated when it was first organized. The NG is now regularly activated for "peace-keeping" missions, for homeland security missions and in anticipation of a military response in foreign countries. Even when it performs a homeland defense mission within homeland security the NG performs in a "WarFighter" or military police role.

The National Guardsman is typically well trained to perform as a "WarFighter" or in direct support of the WarFighter mission. The NG Military Police can function in the police role; however, they lack specific training in that other category known as "security," that is, the protection of critical infrastructures, vital material and individuals, or identification and mitigation of the "insider threat ¹." Many NG troops are knowledgeable about various aspects of "information technology" (IT); however, most are not computer specialists who can develop, collect and maintain massive integrated databases, develop and maintain in-depth information query systems that use that data for control or intelligence purposes, or maintain the hardware systems that must service such activities. NG Engineers are knowledgeable about maintaining, repairing or destroying such vital infrastructure elements as bridges, tunnels, roads and buildings; however, their experiences are in support of military actions and rarely in support of natural catastrophes. Finally, the NG has units that are trained in the art and science of "Civil Government"; however, few are trained in the legal and legislative functions that underlie the success of reestablishing and/or stabilizing a civil government following a natural disaster or a terrorist attack.

¹ The "Insider Threat" is a threat to the organization or mission by a psychologically impaired, drug addicted, alcohol abusive, financially unstable, and/or spouse or child abusive employee who may inadvertently or by coercion by a political or criminal entity provide classified and/or sensitive information, access or material vital to the organization or mission (see M. Hershkowitz, "The 'Insider Threat' and How to Minimize It," Homeland Protection Professional, Vol. 4, No. 8, 2005, pp. 10-12; M. Hershkowitz, "Ensuring Good Judgement," in S. J. Davies and R. R. Minion (eds.), **Security Supervisor Training Manual**, Butterworth-Heinemann, Division of Reed Publishing (USA, Inc.), Stoneheim, MA, 1995, pp. 42-47; and M. Hershkowitz and L. Gebrowsky, "The Personnel Security Assurance Program: An Overview, with Emphasis on Training and Training Impact," proceedings volume of the 13th Annual TRADE Conference: Changing Expectations and Performance, 1989, pp. 47-52)..

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Guide for Establishing a State Defense Force With a Homeland Security Mission				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) State Defense Force Publication Center,19819 Maycrest Way,Germantown,MD,20876-6339				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES See also ADA494465. Pub in: State Defense Force Monograph Series, Winter 2005, Homeland Security. © 2008 State Defense Forces Publications Center. Creative Commons Attribution License.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 14	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

From recent experiences we see that such rebuilding of the civilian sense of trust and of the future are both tenuous and difficult to achieve.

The purpose of this Guide ² is to provide a structure for organizing a volunteer military SDF unit that State TAGs can activate in support of their NG's natural disaster, homeland security and/or community assistance functions. A well-designed SDF would fully integrate with the NG by supplying talent through TAG to the Governor and the citizenry of the State on a voluntary basis that the NG either lacks, is weak in providing or is unable to provide due to a commitment to a Federal mission.

A MANDATE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

The President has spoken, the Congress has spoken, the electorate has spoken, the United Nations has spoken, the Congress has spoken again by enacting legislation to establish a U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The U.S. Department of Defense has augmented this effort by establishing the Northern Command to provide the Homeland Defense contingent of Homeland Security. This is a mandate for a massive antiterrorist effort throughout the world. The antithesis of this is a counter-world-wide effort by the terrorists and political entities that support terrorist activities. Herein lies the mandate for homeland security efforts throughout the world.

The United States, as the leader in the worldwide effort to halt and hopefully to destroy terrorist action groups and governments that actively support terrorists, is clearly marked for massive retaliation by this enemy. In anticipation of this attack on our homeland, the Congress has provided the President and the Governors with legislative guidance and funding to establish Homeland Security organizations in every State of the Nation and our National Territories.

Within six months of the Congressional guidance, Homeland Security directorates or offices have been established with reasonably stated missions. Limited Federal military and other support are already being made available through expanded Department of Defense Rapid Assessment and Immediate Decontamination (RAID) units, the U.S. Army at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the Department of Health and Human Services at Atlanta, Georgia and an expanded selection of the National Guard. Other "players" will come from such State and municipal agencies and organizations as the State Police, State health agencies, municipal police, hospitals and local physicians (all basically "First Responders"), and some of the remaining NG units. The National Guard Bureau's Office of Homeland Security has indicated its belief that the terrorist threat dictates the growing role of the NG in homeland security in the coming decades.

On the surface, this force would seem to be adequate to provide security for our borders, critical infrastructures, critical material logistics depots, buildings, etc. Analyzing below the surface, however, raises the question of impact on other functions when they are stripped to staff the Homeland Security mission(s): the reduced State Police presence, the reduced local police presence, the lack of medical staff at the hospitals, the reduced availability of local physicians, the reduced capabilities of the NG to perform vital Federal military missions, the empty offices in other State agencies with other vital State

² A "guide" by its very nature is meant to present all possibilities and alternatives, presenting the reader with a roadmap, including pathways, options and concerns for consideration. The reader should not expect that this "Guide" will be a proposal, which is specific to actual activities and approved missions to be implemented; thus, much more succinct in nature. Rather, the reader is presented with several levels of SDF configuration, including optional missions that may be authorized by TAG to assist the NG in support of requesting or sponsoring State or municipal agencies and approved by them.

functions. In addition to the above, there remain questions concerning the needed intelligence effort to determine targets needing primary protection, the massive IT effort needed to support that intelligence effort, the training function that must be established to help grow the Homeland Security directorate or office and prepare its members to function at the highest levels of proficiency, and the ability to mount a Personnel Security Assurance Program (sometimes referred to as a Human Reliability Program or a Personnel Reliability Program) to eliminate or at least minimize the potential “insider threat” (that is, the threat presented by employees under the influence of chemical substances or excess use of alcohol, psychiatric or psychological impairment, financial instability, with criminal backgrounds, or child and spouse abusers). It becomes clear that the new Homeland Security directorates or offices will be functioning at less than adequate levels.

As final insight into the State’s homeland security need for all the support it can receive from an integrated Federal resource, consider past Federal massive reorganization experiences. The new U.S. Department of Homeland Security, composed of 22 distinct agencies (many having overlapping responsibilities) with 170,000 employees will take many years to become the cohesive operation needed by the States seeking policy guidance, operational funding support and priorities from a central source. The Department of Defense was created in 1947, yet the full planned for power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not realized until 1986; the U.S. Department of Energy was created in 1977, yet it still remains a patchwork of national security and numerous other energy related organizations led by a variety of military and civilian appointees, and competing for budget priorities and political control.

Therein lies the need for a support operation that can back up the State’s Homeland Security staff with appropriate expertise and in such a manner as to permit the Homeland Security staff to rapidly grow into their positions with an appropriate level of expertise. An additional benefit from this would be to free up more State and municipal police, medical personnel and the NG to return to their principal vital functions.

DESIGN FOR A VOLUNTEER STATE DEFENSE FORCE TO FULFILL THE HOMELAND SECURITY SUPPORT FUNCTION

The design phase covers both the recognition of the various mission options and roles that a volunteer SDF can undertake through TAG to provide authorized support to the State in general and its homeland security effort in particular, and the organizational elements that will meet those needs. Throughout this design phase it is vital to incorporate safeguards to ensure that SDF volunteers are trained to properly conduct missions assigned to them and to have those missions monitored by knowledgeable professionals to guarantee that the volunteers do not exceed the mission guidelines.

Roles for the State Defense Force³

From previous discussions, it follows that there should be three specific roles:

- The traditional role, although not exciting or demanding, is one that has received acceptance in all of the existing SDF organizations. This is the authorized administrative back up of the NG through protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence; the

³ For a view of the totality of the several SDF configurations and optional missions that TAG may authorize, see the table at the end of this Guide. Keep firmly in mind that, for a SDF to be successful, the missions must be authorized by TAG in support of the NG and as approved by the requesting or sponsoring agency.

“Trooping of Colors” at State approved functions; Honor Guard details at military burials or other special functions; and assistance at community activities, as approved by TAG.

- The non-traditional and quite limited role of authorized assistance, as approved by TAG, to the State Emergency Management Agency, State Police and municipal authorities in anticipation of and/or following a natural disaster, such as hurricanes, tornadoes or floods. Typically, one or more of these agencies, including elements of the NG, will refuse any SDF assistance; however, in the rare case when the offer is sought after or accepted, and this will occur on occasion, a SDF must be prepared to offer a certain level of needed assistance. The support may take the form of providing perimeter protection; logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter; transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing; and, in that very special case, the use and manning of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles.
- The very non-traditional and likewise very limited role of authorized assistance to the Homeland Security directorate, as approved by TAG, in preparation for anticipating and combating terrorist threats within the State. This is one role that the idea of depending on a volunteer organization to provide continuing and competent support will cause the potentially receiving organization(s) to be extraordinarily cautious and negative. It therefore falls upon the SDF Command to identify specific areas within which the other agencies will lack sufficient expertise and to ensure that its SDF units can indeed provide that expertise on a regular basis. Herein lies the most interesting challenge for a SDF Command. The immediate choice falls to provision of security as it exceeds the military and local police effort, that is, the establishment of appropriately, professionally monitored perimeter protection, leadership protection, personnel security assurance, policy guidance on the extent to which such security differs from police security and the training that will ensure a continued expertise. The next immediate choice is that of providing appropriately, professionally monitored in-depth, integrated IT approaches that will address intelligence, data search, cross-referencing and analysis of information, computer and system programming, and data entry. Here is where most homeland security efforts will falter and bog down awaiting results; here is where an appropriately organized and monitored SDF can make a definitive contribution. Still another area of support is the ability to assist Homeland Security attorneys in determining legal need and assessing the needed legislative redirection to accommodate that legal need. One example is to provide easily understood both legal and operational guidelines on the difference between “retain” and “restrain.” The latter alludes to the “sworn officer’s” authorization to use various levels of physical force to prevent entry to a location that is restricted to special access, while the former alludes to preventing access to such areas without “laying on of hands.”
- A fourth SDF activity not addressed above, but which would enhance each of those roles, is the establishment of a medical group or MEDGRU of physicians, nurses and other health providing individuals (including administrators and technicians) who, for one reason or another, have not been identified or are not currently functioning as First Responders. At a minimum, this group can provide aid and comfort at parades and other celebratory events by treating heat exhaustion, minor automobile injuries, skinned knees and elbows, splinter removal, etc. In support of disaster mitigation, the MEDGRU can provide secondary medical attention as the First Responders and triage teams deal with the “incoming” injured and shock victims. However, in the case of homeland security activities involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD, i.e., biological, chemical or nuclear weapons) the support is not for the injured, for which it is

unlikely that the MEDGRU team members would have specific experience or training to provide direct medical assistance, but for the WMD Response Team members who will be suffering from heat exhaustion, dehydration, physical exhaustion, emotional shock and a variety of related minor physical injuries.

On initial examination, each of the roles above appears to be significantly different from the others as to require very different expertise and experience to conduct their mission(s). Upon closer examination, each also requires a very similar expertise and experience in command leadership, planning, administration and training. As might be expected, these two disparate and opposing staffing requirements can lead to territorial friction between the roles or mission groupings. This potential problem must be addressed early in the developmental process by the SDF leadership cadre, channeling the potential territorial friction into productive competition in order to achieve high levels of mission performance. In order to achieve this, the SDF Commander must exercise extreme care in selecting and appointing the leadership and training elements for each role or mission grouping, concentrating on recognized knowledgeable professionals.

Initial Cadre Elements for Establishing a Volunteer State Defense Force

The final organizing of an approved and active volunteer, uniformed SDF is a later-stage activity. Initially, it is vital to begin the thinking and then planning functions of how to organize the effort of identifying and selecting the most suitable support efforts for the Homeland Security directorate to best accomplish its assigned mission(s). To accomplish this, it becomes apparent that an “inner-cadre” of senior officers and enlisted personnel is required as the kernel for creating the structure that will eventually form the SDF cadre upon which a SDF can be called into service. This inner-cadre must be prepared to undertake an extensive and agonizing burden at their own expense to accomplish this most vital activity in the development of the SDF.

As the first step, the SDF Command Coordinator should select five (5) senior persons as his “Deputies” for thinking and planning purposes. Note that these individuals are not to be considered as Deputy Commanding Generals or Brigade Commanders or Battalion Commanders, but rather as the senior cadre for thinking and planning purposes. These individuals should be given assignments as follows:

- One “Deputy” should be responsible for planning for a force to be the kernel for conducting the traditional military support functions, including Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities, armory protection, parades, community events, communications, and support for the NG museum and library. This should involve an inventory of all armories and other Army and Air NG locations; planned State and community events; communications equipment and repeaters; the names and telephone numbers of the Mayors, County Executives and Commission Chairmen, and their Directors of Public Safety; location of Federal and State surplus supply warehouses; and local businesses that supply military style clothing, equipment and surplus materials. It should also include an inventory of all potential SDF volunteers and their willingness to serve. Likewise, in support of this effort, the Deputy should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in identifying and cataloging the inventories and potential SDF personnel.
- One “Deputy” should be responsible for planning for a force to be the kernel for conducting the natural disaster mitigation support function. This should include an inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings throughout the State that could be damaged by

hurricanes, tornadoes or floods. Furthermore, it should also include an inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations in the State, and an indication as to the extent that the owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation. In support of this effort, the Deputy should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in cataloging targets, materials and potential SDF personnel; although age should not be a determining factor, the MEDGRU should determine whether each volunteer for these activities is capable of performing under such demanding conditions.

- The homeland security support effort is somewhat different as its missions are most encompassing and complex. Accordingly, this mission grouping will require two (2) “Deputies,” one totally responsible for thinking through and planning the IT function in support of the Homeland Security directorate and the other Deputy totally responsible for thinking through and planning the security function in support of the Homeland Security directorate. Both will have responsibility for the massive training efforts involved in their area of responsibility. The IT Deputy function will identify and inventory all State offices and all industries within the State that utilize a major IT effort in support of their activity; for instance, payroll, personnel, health and human services, and military and police assignments to mention just a very few. It will also identify and inventory all IT hardware centers and suppliers within the State. The IT Deputy will also work with the Homeland Security directorate to identify and inventory all areas of IT activity and potential support needs being considered by that directorate. The Security Deputy function will identify all Federal, State, municipal and business groups that provide various security efforts throughout the State. It will also identify and inventory all likely targets of terrorist activity that might compromise the State’s vital infrastructures and operations, for instance, bridges, tunnels, rivers, power stations, highways, water reservoirs, docking and warehousing facilities, airports, train and bus stations, hospitals and military installations to mention just a very few. Both Deputy functions will identify and inventory all training facilities in support of their own functions. They should also include an inventory of all potential SDF volunteers, their expertise, availability and willingness to serve under difficult operational conditions. Likewise, in support of these efforts, the Deputies should identify and recruit a small number of suitable individuals to assist in identifying and cataloging the inventories and potential SDF personnel.
- Finally, the remaining, fifth Deputy will function more like a Chief of Staff, although not with those specific responsibilities. In addition to functioning as a coordinator of and a confidant for the activities of the other four Deputies, this function will have certain esoteric responsibilities, as follows:
 - Initiate a public relations effort.
 - Identify legislators willing to modify or enact legislation in support of a SDF.
 - Identify businessmen willing to provide personal and other support for a SDF.
 - Identify secondary and higher education leaders willing to support a SDF.
 - Identify retired military and public safety leadership willing to support a SDF.
 - Nominate staff to be appointed to the Citizen Corps Councils.
 - Identify a physician to develop and lead the SDF MEDGRU.
 - Obtain a list of all privately owned boats suitable to support coastal watch.
 - Obtain a list of all privately owned aircraft suitable to support coastal air watch.
 - Establish a SDF State Chapter under the State Guard Association of the U.S.

In addition –

- Establish a SDF State Guard Benefit Foundation under the SDF State Chapter of the State Guard Association of the U.S. as a nonprofit 501 (c) (3) to accept gifts of funds, equipment, materials and other support for the SDF.
- Establish a volunteer SDF Cadet Corps.
- Establish an Advisory Council of identified businessmen, educators and retired military and public safety leadership who would be willing to provide insight, guidance and advice beneficial to a SDF, but do not wish to serve in the SDF because of monthly drill, annual muster and periodic exercise requirements.

As with the other four Deputies, a number of suitable individuals, each with one or more of the special expertise suggested above, should be identified and recruited to assist in carrying out these activities.

The last three activities, above, are quite important to the growth potential of a SDF. The State Guard Benefit Foundation is a legitimate charity vehicle for individuals, businesses and other nonprofit organizations to provide funds, equipment (such as, communications gear, vehicles, copy machines, computers, satellite telephone equipment and services, desks, file cabinets, chairs, uniforms, field equipment, cameras), materials (such as, paper, envelopes, stamps, medical supplies, tents, foodstuffs, fuel) and other support (such as, assistance in public relations, legislative lobbying, audio-visual training materials, staff specialists in IT, security, and other desirable areas for purposes of training) for a SDF.

The SDF Cadet Corps is a very special recruiting device.⁴ In order to establish one it is necessary for the State Legislature to require that community service be a requirement for high school graduation, as was done in Maryland. The Cadet Corps provides many of these students the opportunity to obtain their community service credits through the SDF, which is considerably different from traditional opportunities for community service. The requirements are straight forward; however, because of the politics involved, they become quite time consuming. The stages are as follows: (1) Establish a legislative requirement for community service for high school graduation; (2) Obtain TAG's approval to establish a SDF Cadet Corps to provide community service credit, which must include provisions for medical coverage, worker compensation insurance and other traditional coverage for members of a SDF (this may require a modification to existing legislation); (3) Issuance of a SDF Directive establishing the Corps as a unit of the SDF; (4) Formal acceptance by the school systems of the SDF as a provider of community service opportunities and credit; (5) Issuance of a Directive providing operational guidance for the Corps Commandant and staff; (6) Training materials and classes for the Cadets; and (7) A procedure for periodic reporting of credit for each Cadet to the appropriate school system. The Cadet Corps also offers an unexpected benefit upon graduation, which are potential recruits for the SDF, the NG or the active military.

An alternative to the precise configuration of the suggested SDF Cadet Corps, above, is to sponsor Explorer Scout units, with desired specialties, assigned to selected SDF units. In this manner, some of

⁴ Colonel M. Hershkowitz, (MDDF-Ret), "Recruitment and Community Service: A Two-Edged Sword," The SGAUS Journal: Articles and Book Reviews, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2000, pp.21(1-12).

the political/administrative complexities of the suggested Cadet Corps may be eliminated; however, some of the propriety control may be lost as well. Other military style youth volunteer organizations provide similar positive and negative aspects.

The Advisory Council provides an excellent opportunity to obtain valuable input without the “cost” of very high military rank appointment against an existing Table of Organization and Equipment or the need for these persons to attend regular meetings. These individuals are in the position to offer advice based on extensive personal experience and to influence other groups, such as legislators, political appointees, State and municipal public safety leaders, health service providers, news media, local educators and the Homeland Security Director, to support and utilize the SDF whenever the need becomes apparent.

Identifying the availability of privately owned suitable boats and aircraft provide the potential for a SDF water and air armada to augment U.S. Coast Guard, State Police and Civil Air Patrol efforts in support of homeland security coastal watch, and search and rescue.

In all information and data searches mentioned above, obtaining 100% of the items is desirable; however, obtaining 90-95% is often more cost-efficient. The remaining 5-10% can be obtained piecemeal over time while attempting to maintain the viability of the existing information and data through updates.

The Training Imperative

All organizations, military or civilian, require continuing technical and leadership (management) training to permit and encourage its staff to meet and exceed performance goals. Military organizations require additional training in military order, custom and courtesy. Because a SDF is a volunteer organization that meets infrequently, the requirement for the military, technical and leadership training is even greater for the lessons to have their desired effect. Thus, SDF training must, by its nature, be more intensive and requires a greater sense of unit cooperation and team building.

Having addressed the need for extensive and intensive training the unanswered question is how to obtain and expense the cost of such training. It is clear that little or no funds are currently available within TAG’s current budget, nor is there an expectation that such funds will be made available within the foreseeable future. The impetus then rests with a SDF cadre to resolve this issue.

The SDF’s initial leadership cadre will be under tremendous pressure to identify and recruit individuals, each with recognized expertise in both the military training requirements and at least one identified mission related technical area to form and prepare the next level of leaders. To further complicate this identification and recruitment effort, the initial and “second round” leaders must be experienced in adult training, preferably of volunteers, and in group and team facilitation. Thus formulated, a SDF can provide its own training capability with little or no reliance on constrained NG or other State resources.

There is some minimal level of training support that the State can provide to its SDF from its current inventory without impacting any constrained resources. The NG and other mission related agencies can provide available textbooks, training materials and other related documents. Furthermore, the NG should be expected to provide available training facilities and audio-visual equipment and materials whenever they are not in use by NG personnel (as a volunteer organization, a SDF can schedule its needs for those periods when they are not in use by the NG). However, in the final analysis, SDF staff must

develop and provide its own trainers and training materials as volunteers training volunteers at their own expense of time and materials.

A Word on Recruitment and Recruits

The traditional SDF recruitment pools are recently retired active military, reserve and NG officers and enlisted personnel. Members from this group will join a SDF because of the sense of a comradery among volunteers, because of the comfort level obtained from being among uniformed persons once again, or because of having served the military well and received much in return they wish to “repay” that emotional “debt” through continued community service with a SDF. Another traditional pool is those individuals who were unable to serve or to complete a full service commitment due to a medical disability that would not affect service in a SDF, thus, permitting them to perform community service while wearing a military uniform. Another, lesser pool is one composed of the family, friends and colleagues of current members of a SDF who speak highly of pleasure derived from serving their State, community and fellow citizens in this manner.

Unfortunately, the preponderance of recruits from these pools is principally in the older age groupings and so their ability to serve long periods of time in a SDF is greatly reduced. What is needed is a great effort to recruit from younger age groupings, permitting sufficient time to train these individuals and an expected longer service period from them thereafter. Thus, the idea of establishing a SDF Cadet Corps and of involving secondary and higher education leadership in a SDF should help to meet that requirement.

There are two simultaneous tracks that must be pursued in order to accomplish this. One is to provide missions that have either or both homeland security and community service components, and a training component that exceeds the traditional formation, marching, guard-mounting and military deportment components. Although these components are needed, first aid and beyond, communications, IT, land-based navigation, etc., are far more exciting and have some application in the academic classroom. Other activities, such as preparing directives, media releases, action reports, training manuals and other documents; assistance in intelligence gathering activities and preparing periodic exercises; assistance to in-school activities; and assistance in providing support to homebound individuals, through such activities as “meals-on-wheels” and assistance in taxi service between home and medical providers, are all excellent experiences for the younger recruit.

The other simultaneous track requires identifying and recruiting senior, experienced persons in each of the required disciplines who are willing to undertake the extensive responsibilities of training volunteers, at their own expense, over extended time periods and of monitoring these volunteers in the conduct of a mission. It is, therefore, incumbent upon these senior individuals to be committed to the military concept of “volunteer.”

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This “Guide” has suggested a dynamic and proactive SDF to provide the NG with needed assistance in a variety of State emergency and local community situations as a gap in such support is established by the increasing role of the NG in homeland defense and security. However, can a SDF actually obtain such a level of operational expertise and acceptance?

There are three conditions that a SDF must satisfy in order to be considered the SDF alluded to herein. The first is a proposed SDF leadership that truly sees itself in this role. The leadership must accept the fact that this SDF is not just simply a place for “old soldiers” to gather for an evening’s coffee drinking and “war-story” telling entertainment or a uniformed NG “reserve” that functions only on mundane tasks deemed acceptable by both the NG and State political leadership or a group that can be depended upon by local and municipal groups to march in holiday parades. These tasks are acceptable to a growing, viable SDF membership; however, only when the SDF is involved in the vital activities described herein.

The second condition is acceptance by the political, legislative and State bureaucratic leadership of a SDF as an important “cog” in their functioning machinery. That is, a willingness to recognize the potential of a SDF, the designation of specific areas and activities within which tasks can be assigned to a SDF, an expectation that a SDF will deliver a service or product that will integrate with their needs and an understanding that the SDF is there to augment their mission and functions, not to infringe upon them. And, recognition by the functioning members of the State and Federal organizations involved of the potential for acceptable performance by SDF personnel assigned in support of their efforts.

The third condition involves the use of volunteers to conduct critical missions. A civilian volunteer or group of volunteers can say “no” to an assignment or to just simply say “enough” and walk away during the conduct of a mission. Civilian volunteer service agencies continuously suffer from this condition, often having to rely on the same very small kernel of their volunteer force to “always be there.” Elements of the Citizens Corps, such as the Association of Chiefs of Police and the Volunteers In Police Service have expressed concern over this. In contrast to this, a SDF is fully staffed by volunteers who are much less likely to display the “no” or “enough” syndrome. The aspect of serving as a volunteer within a military hierarchy provides the military structure of following orders within a command and control environment. Within the guidelines of a “military” volunteer subject to the rules of military law and justice, SDF personnel typically accept assignments and, once having done so, rarely walk away from one. Therefore, this places a great deal of pressure on the recruiting function to seek out and accept membership from individuals who will not refuse a mission, who will not walk out in the midst of a mission, and who will have the commitment and the stamina to perform as needed. This, in turn, places a special requirement on the MEDGRU to examine and medically qualify SDF members for specific types of missions.

A final and critical caveat! Regardless of the existence in State Law, Rules and Regulations of a provision for the establishment of a SDF, one cannot exist or function without the approval of TAG and concurrence of the Governor, nor can a SDF perform a mission without TAG’s authorization. It is, therefore, necessary that the concept of a SDF be based on that organization being utilized to backfill the NG on any NG mission in support of State needs, where a gap in such support is ascertained by either the NG or the State agency requiring the assistance.

The decision as to whether a SDF can be formed to meet these conditions lies fully with the Governor, TAG and the Commanding General of the SDF. Should a positive decision be made to establish a SDF, a corollary decision to provide a small operating budget for the SDF, administrated by TAG, but independent of the NG budget, would be desirable.

Two final concerns! One has to do with civil libertarians who may feel threatened by the use of SDF military-style volunteers involved in activities normally conducted by authorized State and municipal appointees, employees and contractors. The second has to do with the fear of elected and appointed officials over the potential threat to constitutional and property rights, and the potential infringement into

government agency territories. Both groups have to accept that in the face of potential terrorist acts they must overcome the worst of these silly territorial constructs and be willing to make the additional sacrifices necessary to mitigate the danger.^{5,6}

⁵ The authors are indebted to Colonel William L. Witham, Jr., (DNG-Ret), Brigadier General Donn Devine (DNG-Ret) and Mr. David V. Skocik for their reviews of and insightful comments on this Guide leading to improvements in concept and concerns. Colonel Witham is a sitting Judge of the Delaware Superior Court, has served as Deputy STARC Commander, as an Armor officer in the USAR, as DNG Quartermaster and as President of various Court Martial Boards; Brigadier General Devine is an attorney, has served in a variety of major staff positions, including Inspector General, Public Information Office Commander and DNG Historian, commanded an Artillery unit, published a history of the DNG, and has recently retired as Director of Planning for the City of Wilmington, Delaware; Mr. Skocik is a consultant in public relations for business, education and nonprofit organizations, has served in several military organizations, including the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Army NG and the U.S. Naval Reserve, and until recently as Director of College Relations and Assistant Professor of Communication at Wesley College. All three are assisting the Delaware National Guard Command Coordinator for establishing a Delaware State Defense Force.

⁶ The contents of this “Guide” are proprietary and subject to copyright by the authors. The concepts contained herein are intended solely for use by State and Federal National Guard entities, State and Federal agencies involved in or in support of Homeland Security, and authorized State Defense Forces. Either author must be contacted to obtain permission to further disseminate, distribute, copy or otherwise take action in relation to the contents of this Guide. Any such action without the permission of one of the authors is prohibited.

**OPTIONAL MISSIONS THAT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY
THE STATE ADJUTANT GENERAL
FOR DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF A STATE DEFENSE FORCE**

Traditional Missions	Addition of Non-Traditional Missions Following a Natural Disaster	Addition of Non-Traditional Missions in Support of Homeland Security	Independent Developmental Tasks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities • Perimeter protection • Logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter • Transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing • Use of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles • Inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings that could be damaged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of armories when the specific NG unit is temporarily not in residence • “Trooping of Colors” at State approved parades and other functions • Color, Burial and other Honor Guard activities • Support for the NG museum and library • Assistance at approved community activities • Perimeter protection • Logistics involving the storage and/or distribution of food, bedding and/or shelter • Transportation guidance to safe roadways and emergency housing • Use of personally owned heavy equipment and 4-wheel drive vehicles • Inventory of all bridges, tunnels, highways, hospitals and public buildings that could be damaged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public relations effort • Identify legislators willing to modify or enact legislation in support of a SDF • Identify businessmen willing to provide personal and other support for a SDF • Identify secondary and higher education leaders willing to support a SDF • Identify retired military and public safety leadership willing to support a SDF • Nominate staff to be appointed to the Citizen Corps Councils • Identify a physician to develop and lead the SDF MEDGRU • Obtain a list of all privately owned boats suitable to support coastal watch • Obtain a list of all privately owned aircraft suitable to support coastal air watch • Establish a SDF State Chapter under the State Guard Association of the US

- Inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations
- Extent that owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation
- Inventory of all construction and material warehouse organizations
- Extent that owners and employees would be willing to volunteer their materials and labor for disaster mitigation
- Leadership protection
- Personnel security assurance
- Policy guidance on the extent to which SDF security differs from police security
- Training that ensures a continued expertise
- In-depth, integrated IT approach addressing intelligence, data search, cross-referencing and analysis of information, computer and system programming, and data entry
- Assist Homeland Security attorneys in determining legal need and assessing the needed legislative redirection
- Identify and inventory all State offices and all industries that utilize a major IT effort
- Identify and inventory all IT hardware centers and suppliers within the State
- Identify all Federal, State, municipal and business groups that provide security efforts throughout the State
- Establish a SDF State Guard Benefit Foundation under the SDF State Chapter of the State Guard Association of the U.S. as a nonprofit 501 (c) (3)
- Establish a volunteer SDF Cadet Corps
- Establish an Advisory Council of identified businessmen, educators and retired military and public safety leadership

MEDGRU: Limited to medical examinations of SDF members, and aid and comfort at parades and other celebratory events by treating heat exhaustion, minor automobile injuries, skinned knees and elbows, and splinter removal.

MEDGRU: Expanded to provide medical services for injured persons, as needed, at a natural disaster site (secondary medical attention as First Responders and triage teams deal with the “incoming” injured and shock victims).

- Identify and inventory all likely targets of terrorist activity that might compromise the State’s vital infrastructure and operations

MEDGRU: Expanded to provide medical services for military and First Responder personnel at a terrorist attack site for heat exhaustion, dehydration, physical exhaustion, emotional shock and a variety of related minor physical injuries.